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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
case as to the existence of an attorney's special lien. In some states the
lien exists by virtue of judicial decision, in others by virtue of statute.
Thayer v. Daniels (1873), 113 Mass. 129 and Central Railroad and Banking
Co. of Georgia v. Pettus (1884), 113 U. S. 116 exemplify the former type;
the Judiciary Law of New York, Secs. 474 and 475, typifies the statutory
lien. But as to the method of procedure there seems, however, to be some
confusion. The case of Prichard v. Fulmer (1916), 22 N. M. 134, 159 P. 39,
2 A. L. R. 474, in accord with the principal case on the method of procedure,
held that an attorney could not assert his lien in an independent suit, since
the court would afford ample remedy in the original suit. This seems to be
the better rule, and is illustrative of the trend of modern authority. See
Vaughan v. Hill (1922), 154 Ark. 528, 242 S. W. 826, and Epp v. Hinton
(1918), 102 Kan. 435, 170 P. 987, wherein the courts held that an applica-
tion to enforce an attorney's lien for services upon proceeds of a judg-
ment may be made in the case wherein judgment was rendered without
formal pleadings. The reasons for this rule, as pointed out in the cases,
are sound. Obviously, it prevents circuity of action since the attorney is
not required to bring another suit. The plaintiff's client cannot be de-
prived of his right of trial by jury in view of the fact that the issue is
equitable in its nature. Further, the plaintiff's client in every event has
notice of the proceedings against him, so as to enable him to prepare a
defense.
But the case of Weitzel v. Schmidt (1919), 178 N. Y. S. 429, held that the
amount of a lien is to be determined in a later appropriate proceeding,
rather than upon a motion filed by the attorney during the action in which
the judgment was given. This case is decided upon a strict interpretation
of the New York statutes providing for an attorney's lien and fails to
either recognize or account for the forceful and logical reasons supporting
the recognition of a summary proceeding for the enforcement of the at-
torney's lien. S. H., '30.
BIUZS AND NOTES-PRESENTMENT-SUFFICIENCY.-In presenting a prom-
issory note, a notary public, who was assistant teller of the bank holding
the note, called at the office of the maker to demand payment, took up the
matter with the party in charge of the office and stated to such party "I
have note here." Payment was refused. Held, there was a sufficient exhi-
bition of the note to comply with the Kansas Statutes. Toll v. Monitor
Bin ing and Printing Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1928), 26 F. (2d) 51.
There seems to be little doubt that the old rule of the common law was
that nothing short of actual exhibition would constitute sufficient present-
ment, in the absence of circumstances and conduct which would operate as
a waiver. Musson v. Lake (1846), 4 How. 262; Bank of Vergennes v.
Cameron (1849), 7 Barb. 143; Farmers' Bank v. Duvall (1835), 7 Gill, &
J. 78; Shaw v. Reed (1831), 12 Pick. 132; Waring v. Botts (1893), 90 Va.
46, 17 S. E. 739. Decisions which have excused actual presentment where
circumstances indicate a clear waiver on the part of the maker, are justified
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on logical and reasonable grounds. In the Virginia case supra, the Court
said: "This [actual exhibition] is requisite in order that the drawer or
acceptor may be able to judge (1) of the genuineness of the instrument;
(2) of the right of the holder to receive payment; (3) that he may imme-
diately reclaim possession of it, upon paying the amount. If, on demand,
the exhibition of the instrument is not asked for, and the party of whom
demand is made decline on other grounds, a formal presentment by actual
exhibition of the paper is considered as waived."
It is not very clear in the principal case whether the decision rests on
waiver or whether the court held that under the circumstances there was a
substantial exhibition. The court says the presentment was "sufficient as
an exhibition" and then cites the following cases based on waiver: Legg et
al v. Vinal et al. (1895), 165 Mass. 555, 43 N. E. 518; King v. Crowell
(1873), 61 Me. 244. The court also cites Gilpin v. Savage (1908), 60 Misc.
Rep. 605, 112 N. Y. S. 802, another waiver case where demand made over
the telephone was held sufficient. But this decision was reversed, 201
N. Y. 169, 94 N. E. 656, even though the position of the lower court in
holding that for every purpose of demand and refusal, the telephone con-
versation was just as effective as in case of actual presence, is not with-
out merit. The facts of that case, however, may be distinguished from
those of the principal case.
Though the decision in the instant case can be justified on the basis of
waiver, it would seem that the court kept well within the bbunds of reason
in holding, if such was the case, that there was a substantial exhibition of
the note when the notary went to the maker with the note and said it was
in his possession. The court in King v. Crowell, supra, classifies actual
exhibition when the maker expresses no desire to see the note and refuses
to pay, as an "idle ceremony," and quotes from Shaw, C. J., who spoke for
the court in Gilbert v. Dennis (1842), 3 Met. 497: "Even under the law of
tender, which is extremely strict, it is held that where a party to whom a
tender is made declares that he will not accept it, an actual production and
offer of money is not necessary." W. V. W., '30.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE PowER-REGULATION OF BUILDING AND
LOAN AssocuTIoNs.-On account of abuses which have arisen out of build-
ing and loan associations and their practises, they are controlled today by
special legislation designed to protect the investors and shareholders.
An act approved at the 1927 session of the Missouri Legislature created
a Bureau of Building and Loan Supervision, declaring its jurisdiction, as-
signing to it the powers theretofore exercised by the State Department of
Finance over building and loan associations, providing for the administra-
tive officers and personnel of such bureau, fixing their compensation, and
expressly repealing all previous inconsistent acts. Laws of Missouri, 1927,
p. 123.
R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 10229 provided for a building and loan bureau under
the management of a building and loan supervisor. This statute which
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